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Normative Foundations of Human Cooperation 
Ernst Fehr & Ivo Schurtenberger 
A large literature shares the view that social norms shape human cooperation. However, in the 
absence of a clean empirical identification of the relevant norms almost every behavior can be 
rationalized as norm-driven, thus rendering social norms useless as an explanatory construct. This 
raises the question whether there is a parsimonious and empirically convincing social norms-based 
explanation for major cooperation-related behavioral regularities and whether norms are indeed 
causal drivers of cooperative behavior. Here, we show that such an explanation is possible, that 
various powerful methods for the empirical identification of social norms exist, that they all support 
the existence of a norm of conditional cooperation and that social norms have causal effects. Norm 
compliance rests on fundamental motivational inclinations of humans (“social preferences”) that 
also imply a willingness to punish free-riders but normative constraints on peer punishment are 
important for its effectiveness and welfare properties. If given the chance, a large majority of people 
favor the imposition of such constraints through the migration to institutional environments that 
enable the normative guidance of cooperation and norm enforcement behaviors.  
Normative constraints and prescriptions are ubiquitous and pervade almost every aspect of human 
social life, from the mundane to the most profound. They appear to play a role in all social groups and 
they have been documented for a large number of ancient societies1,2 but also play a role in 
contemporary societies. Norms are part of the weave of social life and, if obeyed, they make it 
predictable, constitute social order and become the cement of society3 but if compliance with 
fundamental norms breaks down – as it sometimes happens in the aftermath of lost wars or natural 
disasters – disorder, revolt or revolutionary chaos prevails, and life becomes “solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish and short”.4  
Human cooperation is an equally ubiquitous phenomenon that is present in some form in almost every 
social relationship and is key for the success of social units from the family to the nation state to global 
organizations5. Sometimes, cooperation is in the material self-interest of people but here we are 
interested in those aspects of cooperation where economic incentives alone are not sufficient to 
induce individuals to cooperate because free-riding would maximize their private gains but collectively 
the group would be better off if it’s members cooperated. Throughout human history, myriad 
scenarios are characterized by such social dilemmas. Every successful sequential exchange, in which 
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one party provides the quid pro quo first, constitutes an act of cooperation because the first-moving 
party has to trust while the second-moving party has to refrain from cheating. Our ancestors also faced 
social dilemmas when they hunted large game, during tribal warfare or reciprocal food sharing in times 
of need. Contemporary humans encounter them in team production settings and whenever there is a 
tension between one’s own interest and the reputation of the company, when paying taxes despite 
low probabilities of being caught in tax evasion or in the context of problems of a truly global scale 
such as climate change. 
To what extent, and how do social norms shape human cooperation? There are social norms such as 
the norm to keep a promise or the honesty norm that affect behavior in cooperative contexts although 
the behavioral prescriptions of these norms are not directly related to cooperation. For example, the 
honesty norm proscribes lying and that implies that one should also not lie to evade taxes and the 
norm to keep one’s promises implies that one should also keep promises made to an exchange partner 
but these norms have implications that go far beyond cooperative contexts. In this review, we focus 
instead on social norms that directly prescribe, and limit their prescription to, cooperation and 
punishment behaviors in social dilemma and collective action contexts. An example of such a norm is 
the “conditional cooperation norm” which we define in more detail below. We ask whether these 
norms can, in principle, explain major behavioral regularities observed in collective action contexts, 
what the properties of these norms are and which motivational forces ensure compliance with them, 
and whether they indeed guide or are the causal drivers of behavior in collective action. 
To answer these questions requires a clear definition of social norms. We define them as commonly 
known standards of behavior that are based on widely shared views how individual group members 
ought to behave in a given situation3,6,7. This definition entails three crucial features of social norms. 
First, a social norm establishes a normative standard of behavior that applies to a particular group and 
to a particular situation. Second, the norm is not defined in terms of group members’ actual behavior 
nor in terms of their motives, their compliance or the conditions under which compliance occurs; it is 
exclusively defined in terms of a normative behavioral standard, i.e., how group members ought to 
behave. Third, this normative standard and its widely shared approval is commonly known by group 
members.  
Because a norm requires that the normative standard is widely shared, non-compliance with the norm 
automatically triggers some disapproval. Therefore, if individuals dislike the thought that others 
disapprove of them they automatically have some incentive to comply although, as we will see, this 
incentive may not necessarily be sufficient to induce compliance. We will therefore also ask the 
question which kind of other motives and mechanisms support compliance with social cooperation 
norms and whether they act as a constraint on potential non-compliers or are part of the “intrinsic” 
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motivation of individuals. In this context we will also ask whether the (peer) punishment of norm 
violators is itself a social norm or whether it is driven by other motivational sources.  
The above definition of a social norm implies that norms are not just a property of an individual – they 
constitute a property of the group and are, therefore, collective phenomena that may shape 
individuals’ behaviors, expectations and sometimes even their deep individual properties, i.e., their 
intrinsic motives and preferences. If norms – for example, norms of equity and reciprocity – also shape 
individuals’ preferences, individuals must themselves be regarded as partly “constituted” through 
social practices. In other words, society also exists “within” the individuals.   
Fundamental regularities in cooperation-related behaviors? 
To assess the role of social norms for human cooperation, we describe in a first step major behavioral 
regularities observed in experimental social dilemma games. With the exception of experiments that 
allow for face-to-face communication, the subjects in these games are anonymous to each other. They 
play for real money under conditions where complete free-riding is the dominant strategy for selfish 
individuals in one-shot games and backward induction implies that complete free-riding is also 
predicted in the finitely repeated game. We deliberately restrict ourselves to these experimental 
settings because to precisely identify the role of social norms their predictions must differ from the 
self-interest model. Field evidence, in contrast, typically does not allow to rule out self-interest with 
perfect certainty but below we will point out that many lab observations resemble regularities that are 
observed in naturally occurring environments. In a second step, we then discuss the ability of social 
norms to provide a parsimonious explanation for the regularities.  
The following patterns are among the key findings in the literature:  
(1) Although complete free-riding is a dominant strategy, a substantial share of the subjects 
cooperate in one-shot social dilemmas but free-riding frequently also prevails8,9. However, if 
subjects can communicate about the game before they play it cooperation strongly increases8,10,11 
(Fig. 1a). 
(2) A large proportion of subjects are conditional cooperators, that is, the belief that other group 
members cooperate at high levels induces them to also cooperate at high levels but if others are 
believed to decrease their cooperation these individuals also decrease their cooperation12-14 (Fig. 
1b). 
(3) In finitely repeated public good games (PGG), cooperation is initially relatively high but often 
declines to very low levels towards the final periods15,16. This holds regardless of whether the 
game is frame as a public goods game or as a common pool resource game17. If subjects play the 
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finitely repeated game several times – but each time with a new composition of group members 
– cooperation always starts high and becomes very low towards the end of the game18 (Fig. 1c). 
(4) In finitely repeated public good games, cooperation is generally higher in groups with a stable 
group composition (“partner matching”) compared to random reassignment of individuals to 
groups in every period (“stranger matching”)14,18,19 (Fig. 1d). 
(5) Merely framing a simultaneously played prisoners’ dilemma game differently by calling it 
Community Game instead of Stock Market Game typically causes substantial increases in 
cooperation rates. However, if the game is played sequentially this framing effect vanishes 20,21 
(Fig 1e).  
(6) There is a widespread willingness to punish free-riders even in one-shot interactions although it 
is costly for the punisher22-24 (Fig. 1f). Furthermore, peer punishment opportunities in repeated 
interactions cause large cooperation increases and often lead to near complete and stable 
cooperation under partner matching22,25 (Fig. 1i). These opportunities are, however, also 
associated with high initial costs such that group welfare does not increase (or even decreases) 
for roughly 10 periods22,25.  
(7) The effectiveness of peer punishment in enhancing cooperation is undermined if punishment 
threats signals selfish intentions26-29 and by “perverse”30 or “antisocial” punishment31,32 of 
cooperators in public good games by those who free-ride – a tendency that varies strongly across 
different cultures (Fig. 1g).  
(8) Despite the high initial cost caused by peer-punishment, subjects eventually prefer environments 
with a peer punishment opportunity almost unanimously over an environment that rules out peer 
punishment33,34 (Fig. 1 h). 
(9) The opportunity to reward cooperators – either through the preferred choices of cooperative 
partners35 or through the direct rewarding of those with a high reputation for cooperation36-39 
causes large cooperation increases (Fig. 1i).  
(10) Stable cooperation at very high levels can be achieved when (i) cooperative individuals are 
exogenously matched together40,41 (Fig. 1j) or (ii) in intergenerational public good games when 
individuals can give advice that is common knowledge to the next generation42.  
 
An important question is how insights gained in lab experiments relate to behavior in naturally 
occurring environments. Several studies43-52 demonstrate that individuals’ behavior in the lab is 
predictive of their behavior in relevant field settings. For instance, people who tend to contribute more 
in public good games are more likely to participate in local and national accountability institutions43. 
Fishermen who exhibit more cooperation in a laboratory public good game also show more 
cooperative behavior in a real world common pool resource problem by employing more sustainable 
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fishing techniques; they use buckets with larger holes such that younger shrimps are not yet caught44. 
One study45 shows that Ethiopian communities that face serious common pool resource problems are 
better able to maintain the commons if they have a higher share of people that display conditional 
cooperation in a public goods experiment. This study also provides evidence suggesting that causality 
runs from conditional cooperation to better maintenance of the commons resource. Behaviors 
consistent with conditional cooperation are also observed in field experiments46. Experimentally 
induced signs of uncooperative behavior, such as graffiti or unreturned shopping carts induces people 
to generate more disorder in public spaces. Another study47 examines how punishment behavior by 
community leaders in a social dilemma experiment predicts the success these leaders have in 
managing the communities’ forest commons. Leaders who punish antisocially see worse forest 
outcomes than those who emphasize efficiency and equality in their experimental punishment 
behavior. Finally, evidence from rural labor markets in India indicates the existence of strong collective 
action norms that prevent that casual daily laborers receive payments below the prevailing wage. Poor 
workers typically reject low paying job offers although this means that they remain unemployed for 
that day, and they are willing to incur personal costs to punish workers who accepts wage cuts, even 
when such a norm violators are strangers that come from an unrelated labor market48. As a 
consequence, nominal wages exhibit substantial downwards rigidity that generates substantial 
reductions in labor demand49.  
 
Can social norms explain the regularities in cooperation-related behaviors? 
All above mentioned regularities are largely incompatible with the pure self-interest model, i.e., they 
cannot be explained if it is common knowledge that all actors are rational and selfish. When free-riding 
is the selfishly dominant strategy these actors will never cooperate in a (subgame perfect) equilibrium 
of the public goods game, regardless of whether they are in a one-shot encounter or a finitely repeated 
game with partner or stranger matching. Likewise, because punishment/reward is costly for the 
punisher/rewarder subjects will never punish or reward in a (subgame perfect) equilibrium and, 
therefore, punishment/reward opportunities are futile. This also means that there is no reason for 
subjects to prefer an environment with peer punishment opportunities. Finally, it is also not possible 
to generate cooperation through communication, advice giving or the sorting of individuals if 
selfishness and rationality are common knowledge.  
However, many of these regularities can, at least in principle, be explained if one directly assumes that 
a significant share of individuals has a desire to comply with a social cooperation norm53. We call this 
the direct social norms approach7,41,54,55 because it directly assumes (i) the existence of a norm 𝑐𝑐∗ that 
is defined in terms of a specific behavior and (ii) that individuals have an intrinsic desire to comply with 
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𝑐𝑐∗ without providing a deeper micro-foundation of 𝑐𝑐∗ and motives for norm compliance. In the context 
of cooperation, 𝑐𝑐∗ describes the smallest cooperation level that is consistent with the normative 
prescription. Formally, this can be modelled by a utility function 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 in which individual i’s utility 
depends positively on i’s own material payoff x𝑖𝑖  (which depends on all players’ choices) while negative 
deviations of i’s behavior c𝑖𝑖 from the social norm 𝑐𝑐∗ (c𝑖𝑖 <  𝑐𝑐∗) generate some disutility:  
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 = �x𝑖𝑖  – γ𝑖𝑖(c𝑖𝑖 – 𝑐𝑐∗)2x𝑖𝑖     𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 c𝑖𝑖 <  𝑐𝑐∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 c𝑖𝑖 ≥  𝑐𝑐∗ 
The term γ𝑖𝑖(c𝑖𝑖 – 𝑐𝑐∗)2 denotes the psychic cost of deviating from the social norm (for simplicity these 
costs increase quadratically with negative deviations from the norm (c𝑖𝑖 – 𝑐𝑐∗i) and γ𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 captures an 
individual’s strength of the desire to conform to the norm. This approach represents a simple theory 
of conformism based on the assumption that negative deviations from the norm are, for some reason, 
psychologically costly for individuals with a strictly positive γi. In the context of cooperation, higher 
individual cooperation levels ci are costly and thus reduce the individual’s material payoff xi but if ci 
is below the norm c∗ an increase in ci reduces the costs of non-conformity γi(ci – c∗)2. For a 
sufficiently large level of γi the individual has therefore an incentive to obey the social norm c∗. Note 
that we assume for simplicity that positive deviations from the norm c∗ have no psychological costs or 
benefits. 
It is almost surely the case that the psychological cost of negative deviations from c∗ (i.e., the  γi′s) vary 
across people but the assumption that there are some psychological costs of negative deviations 
makes sense in the light of the definition of a social norm because that definition implies that group 
members widely approve of the norm and that this is known by the subjects. Thus, subjects know that 
if they violate a social norm they are likely to face the disapproval of other people and for some people 
even the mere thought that others might disapprove of their action could constitute a psychological 
cost. In principle, γi could also represent the cost of deviating from a behavioral habit acquired in social 
life. Or the psychological cost of noncompliance could positively depend on the how widely the norm 
is shared among the group members. However, in the following we assume for simplicity that γI is fixed 
and varies across individuals.  
Unconditional normative prescriptions like “be selfless”, “do the right thing” or “be moral” cannot 
explain the behavioral regularities described above. For example, they can neither explain 
communication effects (fact 1) nor can they explain the decline in cooperation over time (fact 2) or the 
higher levels of cooperation in partner compared to stranger matching (fact 3). In contrast, a social 
norm of conditional cooperation can help explain all regularities but those described in fact (6-8). This 
norm prescribes full cooperation as long as other group members also cooperate fully but if others’ 
average cooperation becomes smaller it is normatively justified to match this reduction, that is, the 
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conditional cooperation norm prescribes to contribute at least as much as others’ average 
contribution. Note that this implies that subjects’ empirical beliefs about others’ average cooperation 
become an important determinant of their cooperation levels – the more others cooperate the higher 
is the incentive to cooperate for an individual with a positive γ𝑖𝑖. This explains fact (2).  
But this norm can also explain regularity (1): subjects with a very small γ𝑖𝑖 (γ𝑖𝑖 ≈ 0) will defect while 
those with a sufficiently large γ𝑖𝑖 and a high expectation about others’ cooperation will cooperate in 
one-shot social dilemmas. Moreover, under face-to-face communication subjects often promise to 
each other to cooperate56 which is very likely to increase beliefs about others’ cooperation. This 
increase in others’ expected cooperation will then induce individuals with a sufficiently positive γ𝑖𝑖 to 
increase their cooperation levels.  
It has been shown5,57 that the existence of imperfect conditional cooperators is the key ingredient for 
explaining fact (3) – the decay of cooperation over time in finitely repeated games. Conditional 
cooperation is imperfect if an individual does not match other group member’s average cooperation 
perfectly but cooperates somewhat less than others are expected to cooperate on average. The above 
utility function assumes that people care positively for their own payoff and, therefore, individuals 
with a positive yet sufficiently low γ𝑖𝑖 will not obey the norm 𝑐𝑐
∗ perfectly but reduce ci somewhat below 
𝑐𝑐∗, which implies imperfect conditional cooperation. However, if many individuals cooperate less than 
what each of them expect others’ to cooperate, jointly their expectations are too optimistic, which 
results in a downwards revision of their expectations and this then leads – via conditional cooperation 
– to a further decline in their cooperation rates, etc., etc.. 
The existence of a conditional cooperation norm can also explain fact 4 – the higher cooperation rates 
under a stable group composition – and fact 5, the existence of a framing effect on cooperation in the 
simultaneously played PD but not in the sequentially played PD20. When there is a stable group 
composition, even selfish individuals (i.e., those with γ𝑖𝑖 ≈ 0) have temporarily a strong incentive to 
cooperate because this generates benefits in future periods by inducing conditional cooperators to 
keep contributing (fact 4). To explain fact 5, recall that if there is a norm of conditional cooperation 
subjects who derive disutility from norm violations adjust their cooperation level to what they believe 
the other player will do in the simultaneously played PD. For optimistic beliefs they cooperate, for 
pessimistic beliefs, they defect. Under the plausible assumption that the label “Community Game” 
renders beliefs about the partner’s cooperation more optimistic, conditionally cooperative subjects 
will cooperate with higher frequency. However, for the second mover in the sequential PD beliefs are 
irrelevant because this player already knows exactly what the first-mover did. Thus, the frame can no 
longer change beliefs and thus becomes irrelevant; and if a rational first mover anticipates the absence 
of a framing effect (s)he has no reason to condition behavior on the frame either. Note that this 
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explanation does not assume that the conditional cooperation norm changes across frames or 
between simultaneous and sequential play; a given norm can explain the changes in behavior.  
The conditional cooperation norm can also explain why the addition of mutual reward opportunities 
to a public goods game increases cooperation (fact 9). In the presence of mutual reward opportunities 
subjects can observe the cooperation level of other group members in the public good game after 
which they can spend money on rewarding other group members that costs them less than it benefits 
the rewarded subjects. This basically boils down to the opportunity of playing another bilateral 
prisoners’ dilemma (PD) with each of the other group members after they observed others’ 
cooperation levels. Obviously, the norm of conditional cooperation also applies to these PD games and 
because cooperation in the public good game can serve as a signal of cooperative intent, cooperation 
in the public good game fosters the belief that an individual will also cooperate in the PD. Therefore, 
mutual reward opportunities increase the incentive to cooperate in the public goods game. 
Finally, the conditional cooperation norm can also help explain fact (10), i.e., why the assignment of 
cooperative individuals to the same group may cause high and stable cooperation. In terms of the 
direct social norms approach, cooperative individuals may be viewed as those with a sufficiently high 
γ𝑖𝑖 such that for them perfect obedience with the norm (c𝑖𝑖 =  𝑐𝑐∗) becomes optimal. If, in addition, these 
subjects are told that they are grouped together with other cooperators40 they start with high 
expectations that trigger high cooperation which confirms the initial high expectation. The publicly 
known sorting of cooperative individuals into a group thus renders cooperation an equilibrium 
outcome.  
For a similar reason, the existence of a conditional cooperation norm may also explain why cooperative 
advice by a previous generation of players that is made common knowledge among all current group 
members (fact 10) causes large increases in cooperation rates. Cooperative advice that is common 
knowledge induces a general increase in the expected cooperation of other group members42. 
Together with the norm of conditional cooperation the increased expectations then give rise to a 
general increase in cooperation rates.  
However, although a conditional cooperation norm can potentially explain many above-mentioned 
facts this does not mean that this norm is in fact the driver behind subjects’ choices because there 
could be other motives – such as equity or reciprocity motives – that make similar predictions. 
Moreover, a norm of conditional cooperation cannot explain why subjects punish free-riders (fact 6) 
and thus also not subjects’ preferences for playing the public goods game in an environment that 
allows for peer punishment (fact 8). This follows simply from the fact that the conditional cooperation 
norm is defined in the space of cooperation behavior and not in the space of punishment behavior. 
One may, of course, stipulate the existence of another norm that renders punishment of free-riders a 
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socially desirable act but (i) there is little evidence for this and (ii) it shows one of the drawbacks of an 
unconstrained direct social norms approach. By stipulating that a particular behavior constitutes a 
social norm it is possible to explain any behavior which renders such an approach irrefutable and thus 
empty – a problem that we take up later.  
With respect to a potential norm that prescribes the punishment of free-riders, there is some evidence 
that punishers can acquire a reputation gain58,59 if punishment of selfish behavior is the only way to 
acquire a prosocial reputation but if there are other ways (e.g., through altruistic helping) punishment 
is much less used as a signal of prosociality. This suggests that punishment is an inferior way of signaling 
prosociality. In addition, it has been found60 that people do not support or reward those who punish 
free-riders and they do not approve of punishers more than they approve of non-punishers. This is in 
line with other evidence61 that shows that those who punish free-riders the most even spend money 
to prevent that their punishment acts become public information, suggesting that they believe it might 
hurt their reputation. Moreover, even if the punishment of free-riders conferred a prosocial reputation 
and thus rendered the individual a desirable exchange partner, this would not indicate that 
punishment is a social norm. There are many altruistic behaviors (e.g., giving to the victims of a 
hurricane) that confer a prosocial reputation if observed by others but nevertheless are not 
normatively required behaviors.  
With regard to the peer punishment of free-riders in lab experiment it is useful to relate them to 
punishment in the field. In reality, peer punishment ranges from a raised eye brow to a mild, yet 
hurtful, smile or verbal insult, from social ridicule to ostracism, from shaming on the internet to the 
expulsion from social groups. These forms of punishment differ widely in the cost for the punisher and 
their hurtfulness for the punished. But to the extent to which they are psychologically or economically 
costly for the punisher and impose psychological or economic cost on the punished they share the key 
features of punishment in the lab. Moreover, one important lesson from lab experiments is that even 
if punishment is costly and yields no material benefit for the punisher it nevertheless systematically 
occurs.  
The psychology of norm compliance 
To make progress in understanding the potential impact of social norms on human cooperation it is 
important to examine more closely the psychological reasons that induce individuals to comply with 
social norms. The direct social norms approach stipulates a normative behavioral standard and a 
psychological cost of non-compliance but does not provide a microfoundation for the behavioral 
standard and is typically not very explicit about the psychological cost of non-compliance. In principle, 
these costs could arise because individuals may be averse to actual, anticipated or merely imagined 
disapproval when deviating from the norm. In this case, compliance rests on an internalized desire for 
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conformism which has been challenged long ago as a general and sufficient basis for norm 
compliance62.  
Another reason for psychological costs of norm compliance arises if individuals have an intrinsic desire 
for equity or fairness and social norms play a role in defining what is perceived as equitable or fair63-65. 
This case is also methodologically interesting because it implies that a collective phenomenon – the 
social norm – substantively affects the content of individuals’ motivation by influencing what is 
perceived as fair while the intrinsic desire for fairness then ensures compliance with the norm. A third 
reason for costs of deviating from the social norm could be that individuals have a desire to reciprocate 
the behavior of relevant others66-68. In this case, the reciprocity motive applies, i.e., the tendency to 
reward kind intentions with kindness (“positive reciprocity”) and to punish hostile or unkind intentions 
(“negative reciprocity”). Note, however, that this motive requires a definition of what constitutes kind 
and unkind behavior which is typically also based on some normative notion of fairness/equity. For a 
reciprocally motivated individual psychic costs of non-compliance arise, if it fails to reciprocate to a 
kind act with kindness or does not retaliate to a hostile act with a hostile response. Therefore, as in 
the case of fairness/equity motives the reciprocity motive becomes operative on the basis of what is 
perceived as fair/kind and unfair/unkind.  
A fourth reason for psychic costs of non-compliance arises if individuals have a propensity towards 
guilt aversion69-71. This theory rests on the idea that individuals experience the aversive, utility-
decreasing, emotion of guilt if they disappoint others. A social norm only exists if group members 
widely approve of the norm, and if there is widespread compliance then an individual act of non-
compliance is almost surely disappointing other individuals. For example, if a subject believes that her 
partner in the prisoners’ dilemma expects her to cooperate then she disappoints him/her if she defects 
and if she feels guilt and anticipates this emotion she has an incentive to cooperate. Therefore, to the 
extent to which social norms generate the belief that others expect the individual to comply – a very 
likely belief in the presence of wide-spread compliance – a guilt averse individual has some incentive 
to cooperate. However, if a social norm is systematically violated such that the individual does not face 
a general expectation of compliance, a guilt averse individual has no reason to comply with the norm. 
Guilt aversion is thus likely to generate conditional norm compliance behavior that is mediated by 
individuals’ beliefs about what others expect from them.  
Finally, self-image theory assumes that individuals assign an intrinsic value to their self-image as a 
prosocial individual72. In this case, non-compliance with socially beneficial norms is detrimental for 
their self-image and provides a psychological deterrent for non-compliance. Similar to the case of 
fairness and reciprocity theories this approach rests on some pre-existing notion – the notion of 
“prosociality” – which is likely to be shaped by social norms.  
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It is interesting that all the above mentioned approaches rest on assumptions about individuals’ 
intrinsic motivational properties. These motives – for example the desire for fairness – are assumed to 
be stable across contexts. Stability in the desire for fairness does not mean, however, that the content 
of what is defined as fair is stable across contexts. It only means that individuals’ preferences for 
implementing what is defined as fair, i.e., their willingness to pay to implement the fair action, is stable 
while what is defined in a given society or group as fair or prosocial can be malleable. Thus, a main 
difference between social preference theories of equity, reciprocity, guilt aversion, and self-image and 
the direct social norms approach is that the former are concrete about the motivational basis of norm 
compliance and these motives are assumed to be stable across contexts whereas the direct social 
norms approach remains vague with respect to the motives underlying norm compliance. 
For example, both conditionally cooperative behavior and the willingness to punish free-riders in a 
public goods game can arise from a desire for fairness or reciprocity. In other words, inequity averse 
subjects and reciprocity-motivated subjects are often conditional cooperators as well as punishers63,68 
and, therefore, these motives contribute to the explanation of all the major qualitative regularities 
mentioned above (except the existence of antisocial or perverse punishment which we discuss below). 
Likewise, the communication effects (fact 1) as well as the framing effects (fact 5) can be explained by 
stable preferences for equity or reciprocity because these preferences imply conditionally cooperative 
behavior such that if frames and pre-play communication renders expectations about others’ 
cooperation more optimistic, subjects will cooperate more.  
Or take, e.g., regularity (4) that “partners” generally cooperate more than “strangers”. The theory of 
inequity aversion or reciprocity can explain this finding by the fact that the existence of inequity averse 
or reciprocal subjects generates incentives for selfish individuals in a partner treatment to invest into 
cooperation during the early periods of a finitely repeated game18. This investment is profitable 
because it maintains the cooperation of the inequity averse or reciprocal subjects in future periods. 
However, this incentive is absent in a stranger treatment where all interactions are one-shot so that 
there are no future gains. Note that this theory also explains that in a partner treatment cooperation 
declines over time but restarts again if subjects play another finitely repeated game18. And because 
the theories explain why people punish free-riders they can account for the punishment-related facts 
(6) – (8). 
In summary, social preferences for fairness/equity, reciprocity or a prosocial self-image and the desire 
to avoid guilt are likely to play an important role in norm compliance. They provide an intrinsic motive 
to obey the normative standard to some extent and/or to sanction those who violate it. All of these 
theories are consistent with the notion that emotions are a key driver of the social preference although 
– with the exception of guilt aversion theory which explicitly models the emotion of guilt – they do not 
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explicitly incorporate emotions in the model. Yet, if an individual has a non-pecuniary desire to 
implement a fair outcome or to punish somebody who behaves unfairly, this desire is perfectly 
compatible with the idea that the emotional warm glow of achieving fairness or the indignation 
resulting from the violation of a fairness norm is the driver behind the social preference.  
Although social preferences help in achieving norm compliance it is important to distinguish them 
conceptually from social norms which are defined as widely shared and approved normative standards. 
These standards are the essence of a social norm and they affect social preferences by defining what 
is considered as fair/equitable, kind or prosocial but they are conceptually nevertheless distinct. In 
particular, social preferences – for example the willingness to give up material resources to implement 
a fair outcome – are a property of the individual while social norms are a property of the group. For 
instance, in some groups the social norm could prescribe that the equal split is fair whereas in a more 
hierarchically organized group some degree of inequality may be required to satisfy the fairness norm. 
Technically, the fairness norm enters an individual’s utility function as an exogenous parameter (at the 
individual level) that determines the individual’s behavior together with the other parameters of the 
utility function. Once the parameters of an individual’s utility function and the fairness norm are known 
and stable, this approach makes clear predictions over a wide range of situations. Of course, to the 
extent to which fairness norms vary across contexts, assuming a stable fairness norm causes wrong 
predictions. Nevertheless, for the sake of generating refutable predictions theories of fairness and 
reciprocity have typically taken a clear stance on the definition of fairness and kindness. 
The direct norm approach on the other hand is silent about the underlying motives that induce 
individuals to comply with a prevailing social norm and theoretical papers that apply this approach54 
often make ad-hoc assumptions about the social norm while empirical studies do not define ex-ante 
the content of the normative standard but instead measure the norm empirically55,73. This renders the 
direct norm approach more flexible and more difficult to refute unless it is possible to reliably identify 
the normative standard empirically over the relevant range of situations. 
How can we identify social norms? 
There are several methods for the identification of social norms24,55,74-76. One method builds on the 
premise that humans are willing to incur personal costs to sanction the violation of a norm even if they 
are not directly hurt by the violation. One reason for this willingness may be that norm violations have 
been shown to cause indignation or even outrage23,77,78 and these emotions may provide the raw 
material for the willingness to punish. Another reason may be that norm violators are typically 
perceived to deserve punishment79 and, therefore, sanctioning them provides satisfaction – a 
hypothesis that is consistent with the finding that reward-related brain areas are activated during the 
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punishment of norm violators80 and that already preschool children and chimpanzees are willing to 
pay for watching the punishment of antisocial actors81.  
Whatever, the precise reason may be, if norm violations trigger the desire to punish the perpetrators, 
we have a potential tool for identifying the norm as those behavior that is not punished by uninvolved 
third parties. Various studies have therefore employed a third party punishment paradigm for the 
study of social norms24,82-85. To identify a potential conditional cooperation norm24, the third party had 
the option to punish the players in a two-person prisoners’ dilemma game after she observed the 
actions of the two players. Every punishment point assigned to a player costs the third party one 
money unit (MU) and the sanctioned party three MUs. If the conditional cooperation norm applies to 
this game we should observe that unilateral defection is more deserving of punishment than bilateral 
defections and that bilateral cooperation is not at all or less punished than bilateral defection. This is 
exactly what the data shows24: 20.8% of third parties punish and the average expenditure on 
sanctioning is 0.6 MUs when both players defect but when a defector is paired with a cooperator the 
third party incurs much higher punishment cost of 3.4 MUs on average and the frequency with which 
they punish is also much higher (45.8%). In contrast, bilateral cooperation is almost never punished 
(4.2%) and the average punishment expenditure is negligible (0.08 Mus). These findings illustrate that 
the same action – free-riding – is perceived as normatively very different depending on whether the 
other player cooperated – a finding that is replicated in two recent studies86,87. Another, survey-based, 
study74 examines subjects’ moral judgments of complete defection in a two-person social dilemma as 
a function of the other person’s cooperation level. Individuals’ moral judgments show again the 
pattern one would expect if a norm of conditional cooperation applies. Defecting on a defecting player 
is perceived as much less or not at all immoral while the condemnation of a defection on a cooperative 
player strongly increases with that player’s cooperation level.  
An interesting method for the identification of social norms is based on the idea that social norms 
provide a focal point such that subjects’ normative judgements are coordinated on this focal point55. 
This approach provides an incentivized measure of social norms by asking subjects to rate the extent 
to which an action is “socially appropriate and consistent with moral or proper social behavior,” or 
“socially inappropriate and inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior.” Subjects choose 
between “very socially inappropriate,” “somewhat socially inappropriate,” “somewhat socially 
appropriate” and “very socially appropriate.” Subjects are not asked to provide their own personal 
evaluation, but to indicate what they believe is the most common answer, and they earn a monetary 
reward if their rating coincides with the modal answer of others. Thus, subjects have a monetary 
incentive to match other subjects’ answers and if the social norm indeed constitutes a focal point the 
subjects have an incentive to assign the “very socially appropriate” rating – or at least the somewhat 
socially appropriate rating – to the behavior prescribed by the social norm. Thus, if a social norm exists 
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the distribution of appropriateness ratings has a peak at the normatively desired behavior. In contrast, 
if no social norm exists, the distribution of appropriateness ratings should be flat. This method has 
already been employed in several studies to elicit the social norm in social dilemmas41,88 and to 
discriminate between the predictive power of the direct social norms approach and inequity 
aversion88. One of these studies41 allows assessing the existence of a conditional cooperation norm in 
a public good game by directly eliciting subjects’ view of the appropriateness of contributions 
conditional on other group members’ behavior. Interestingly, this study shows that zero defection is 
the socially most appropriate behavior regardless of what other group members have contributed, 
suggesting that full cooperation has the largest normative appeal. However, if the average contribution 
of the other group members is low it becomes much more socially appropriate to reduce the 
cooperation rate which is consistent with the notion of conditional cooperation. 
The focal point method of norm identification can also be used to answer the question whether the 
punishment of unfair behavior is a social norm. One study89 applied the method to measure whether 
the punishment of unfair proposers in the ultimatum game – by rejecting their offer – is a social norm. 
Interestingly, the study shows that this is clearly not the case. Although nobody has yet examined 
whether the punishment of free-riders in a public goods game is a social norm the results of the 
ultimatum game study are consistent with the view that punishment of unfair behaviors – of which 
the sanctioning of free-riders is a special case – is not itself a social norm. Rather, the desire to punish 
free-riders seems to derive from other motivates such as to avoid inequity63,90 or to reciprocate to 
unfair actions68,87.  
Another method for the identification of social norms in social dilemma games has recently been 
presented in two papers91,92. Here, each subject of the group is asked to indicate what other group 
member should contribute to the public good. The average of subjects’ normative requests is 
afterwards conveyed to all group members and is likely to constitute a general standard of cooperation 
because it is commonly known and reflects the group members’ views. Moreover, the higher subjects’ 
agreement in their normative requests the more the average request will constitute a legitimate 
normative standard92. This approach enables the identification of the level of the prescribed behavior 
and the normative consensus among the group members which determines the legitimacy or strength 
of the norm. A strong social norm forms when group members give similar answers. Weaker social 
norms are characterized by some disagreement about the appropriate behavior. One advantage of this 
method is that it can be easily implemented in every period of a public goods game such that the level 
and the strength of the norm can be identified continuously. To what extent does this method support 
the existence of a conditional cooperation norm? The data show that the average requested 
contribution in a period is declining in subjects’ average actual contributions in the previous period. 
Hence, this novel approach supports the evidence for the conditional cooperation norm found by the 
15 
other methods. In addition, the data show that when direct targeted punishment of free-riders is 
possible, subjects strongly obey the average normative request in their actual cooperation choices92.  
Thus, taken together, there is ample and diverse evidence for the existence of a conditional 
cooperation norm in social dilemma situations while there is little or no evidence that punishment of 
free-riders constitutes a social norm. These results show that one can provide discipline to the direct 
social norms approach and they strengthen the conjecture that a conditional cooperation norm shapes 
human cooperation. However, these norm elicitation approaches do not yet prove that cooperation 
behavior is causally affected by social norms because they – so far – only establish a correlation 
between the social norm and actual cooperative behavior41. 
Do social norms causally affect cooperation behavior? 
The potential causal effect of social norms on behavior has been studied in various ways. A prominent 
approach93,94 assumes that social norms need to be activated, i.e., become the focus of subjects’ 
attention to affect behavior. Based on this view, a causal effect of social norms can be identified by 
varying the salience of the norm with various priming techniques. This literature shows that when 
subjects’ attention is shifted towards social norms they begin to act in a more norm-congruent way93-
97. For example, in one study94 car drivers, who did not know that they were part of an experiment, 
saw the following handbill on their windshield when they returned to their car located on a large 
parking lot: “April is Keep Arizona Beautiful Month. Please Do Not Litter”. In a second condition, the 
text on the handbill was “April is Conserve Arizona’s Energy Month. Please Turn Off Unnecessary 
Lights”, and in a third (control) condition they could read “April is Arizona’s Fine Arts Month. Please 
Visit Your Local Art Museum”. These treatments are likely to prime a relatively strong anti-littering 
norm in the first case, a weaker anti-littering norm in the second case and no norm in the third case. 
In line with the hypothesis that a stronger activation of the anti-littering norm leads to less littering, 
car drivers threw the handbill on the ground in only in 10% of the cases in the first treatment, in 18% 
of the cases in the second condition and in 25% of the cases in the third condition. Findings like these 
raise the question which aspect of the social norm is the causal driver of the behavior change. Does 
the increase in the salience of the norm change the social appropriateness rating of norm compliant 
behavior? Or does it merely change subjects’ views about how widely the norm is shared? Or does it 
change subjects’ feelings of guilt if they litter? Unfortunately, we do not know the answer to these 
questions.  
Another literature studies the effects of communication on cooperation in settings where subjects 
have the chance to communicate before the play of a social dilemma game. Face-to-face 
communication increases cooperation and there are potentially many channels through which this can 
occur8,10,11,98 but one reason could be that subjects often make cooperation promises in their pre-play 
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interactions. Therefore, if a social norm of keeping promises is at work communication increases 
cooperation56. One study99 explicitly examined the role of promises in communication by allowing 
subjects’ to communicate via computer the numerical contribution level in an entry labelled “possible 
contributions”. Other group members observed these numerical messages and all group members 
could interactively alter their entries within a certain time frame. This type of numerical 
communication generally had no effect on cooperation unless two further features were 
simultaneously present. First, subjects had to have the possibility to impose monetary punishment on 
others and second, they needed to have the possibility to promise to contribute their “possible 
contribution” entry. Unfortunately, none of these communication studies directly identified the 
normatively desired contribution level, which limits the scope for the establishment of a direct link 
between communication and social norms.  
A recent study73 solves this problem by eliciting the socially most appropriate action in two person 
social dilemmas in the presence and in the absence of an informal agreement to choose the 
cooperation level that maximizes the joint payoff. No agreements on other cooperation levels were 
possible. The results show that informal, yet unenforceable, agreements to choose the joint payoff 
maximizing action strongly increases the social appropriateness of that action relative to all other 
actions and causes more cooperative behavior. There is thus a clear empirical link between the 
informal agreement, i.e., the promise to choose the joint payoff-maximizing action, the increase in the 
social norm and the increase in cooperation rates. Although this study clearly shows that the standard 
of behavior (social appropriateness) is causally affected by informal promises, it does not show that 
this change in the standard of what is appropriate directly causes the change in behavior. The reason 
is that the change in the standard could also have opened other psychological channels of behavior 
change. For example, it could be the case that the increase in the normative standard causes an 
increase in what subjects believe that their partner will expect from them and this change in the 
expectation could induce guilt and thus norm compliance could be triggered via guilt aversion.  
The above-mentioned method for norm identification91,92, that relies on subjects’ period-by-period 
normative requests, can also be used to study the causal impact of social norms on behavior by 
comparing treatments in which subjects have the opportunity to announce normative requests with 
treatments where this opportunity is absent. In treatments with normative requests the average 
request constitutes a commonly known standard of behavior that is absent in treatments without 
normative requests. In one study92 the authors introduce the norm formation opportunity in finitely 
repeated public goods games with partner matching where the possibility to punish other group 
members is either absent or present. Interestingly, when the possibility of punishment is absent, the 
opportunity to form a normative standard has no impact on behavior while in the presence of the 
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possibility to punish the normative standard causes a significant and stable increase in cooperation 
rates (Figure 2).  
This radically different impact of social norms on cooperation conditional on the existence of 
punishment opportunities exists despite the fact that the normative standard in the punishment and 
no-punishment treatment is very high and statistically indistinguishable during the first three periods. 
Nevertheless, there occur substantial norm deviations in the absence of punishment from the very 
beginning while in the presence of punishment the norm is largely obeyed throughout the whole 
experiment. Thus, the existence of a normative standard that renders high cooperation the socially 
most appropriate action, and focusses attention on the normative standard, is per se not sufficient to 
induce a change in cooperation behavior, suggesting that intrinsic motives for norm compliance are 
not sufficiently strong and that the punishment threat is needed to establish a stable norm-driven 
behavior change in a population of heterogeneously motivated actors.  
 
  
(a) Public goods game without peer punishment (b) Public goods game with peer punishment 
Figure 2 The effect of social norms with and without punishment 
Notes: This graph is taken from Fehr and Schurtenberger 92. Fixed groups of four subjects play a public good game over 15 periods. The 
graph shows average normalized contributions over time, that is, 1 corresponds to full contributions and 0 to no contributions. 
Treatments with a punishment opportunity also allow for the counter-punishment of those who punish free-riders to examine whether 
norms have a causal impact in an environment that has been shown to be hostile for human cooperation32.  
 
Normative constraints and the (in)efficiency of peer punishment  
The existence of punishment opportunities in public goods games causes strong cooperation increases 
in Western but not in all cultures31,100,101. In particular, in those countries that have weak norms of civic 
cooperation – defined as the willingness to evade taxes, make fraudulent claims to receive welfare 
state benefits or dodging fares on public transport – the antisocial punishment of cooperators is 
particularly strong and is associated with detrimental effects on overall cooperation rates. This finding 
is consistent with the view that norms of civic cooperation have a causal, constraining, effect on 
Without norm formation Without norm formation 
With norm formation 
With norm formation 
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antisocial punishment. However, the finding does not prove causality because there could be other 
reasons that may account for the correlation between antisocial punishment and norms of civic 
cooperation. For example, countries with low norms of civic cooperation often also have bad schools 
(e.g., because of teacher absenteeism or low teacher quality102,103) and school or teacher quality might 
shape both norms of civic cooperation and restraints on antisocial punishment.  
Although the antisocial punishment of above-average cooperators by those who cooperate less tends 
to be rare in Western cultures, it has been observed from the beginning and several potential reasons 
for its existence have been mentioned22. First, in rare cases, it may simply reflect a random choice 
error. Second, there is evidence that a small yet significant proportion of subjects regularly displays 
envious or spiteful motives104,105, implying that they prefer to spend money to hurt others regardless 
of their level of prosociality. Third, antisocial punishment may be the result of a coordination failure 
among reciprocally motivated subjects that are in principle willing to cooperate. Consider a reciprocal 
subject with pessimistic beliefs about others’ cooperation. These subjects may cautiously start with an 
intermediate or low level of cooperation while other subjects have optimistic expectations, start with 
high cooperation and punish those who cooperate less. The pessimistic, yet willing, low contributor 
may view this as an unfair punishment and may thus retaliate in the next period against the high 
contributors. These events may spoil the whole group and lead to a process of punishment and 
counter-punishment with detrimental effects on cooperation. In fact, if subjects are given explicit 
counter-punishment opportunities30,32 some subjects use them to the detriment of the group’s 
cooperation and welfare by punishing those who punished them for free-riding. More generally, public 
goods experiments that allow for peer punishment often fail to increase the overall welfare of the 
group members for an extended period of time despite the large increase in cooperation rates22,25,38. 
The reason for this is the high collateral cost associated with peer punishment.  
However, the very fact that peer punishment can get out of control suggests that societies have 
developed mechanisms to constrain and control it. After all, peer punishment is physically always 
possible when two or more individuals directly interact with each other. It appears impossible for 
society to ever control or constrain all the different forms of peer punishment – that range from a 
raised eye brow or verbal insult to mobbing, ostracism, public shaming and corporal punishment – 
except through the normative control of people’s behavior. Interestingly, the literature on simple 
societies106,107 provides ample evidence on the ways in which societies impose constraints on 
punishment. One study107, for example, reports how the Ju/’hoansi bushmen, a group of hunter-
gatherers living in Botswana subject peer punishment to strong habitual and normative constraints: if 
a man is publicly criticized for norm violations this is often done by a women to avoid the escalation of 
arguments among men.  
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In view of the normative constraints that societies impose on the permissible forms of punishment it 
is interesting to study whether subjects voluntarily impose on themselves institutions that regulate 
punishment by either ruling out peer punishment completely108, replace it by a centralized state that 
automatically imposes taxes to finance public goods109 or by an enforcement mechanism that rules out 
antisocial peer punishment110-113. If given the chance, subjects often prefer institutions that rule out 
antisocial peer punishment but how, in practice, is it possible to achieve this without also ruling out 
peer punishment altogether. More fundamentally, how is it ever possible to rule out peer punishment 
altogether in a world in which people socially interact with each other and in which the centralized 
legal enforcement of rules is always imperfect. Thus, because peer punishment is always possible to 
some degree, a key question is how we can constrain it through normative standards.  
This question can be answered by comparing the punishment patterns in settings with and without 
the opportunity for normative requests92. It turns out that when subjects can form a normative 
cooperation standard the punishment of free-riders becomes less severe. Thus, the normative 
standard increases cooperation while simultaneously decreasing the punishment of free-riders, 
suggesting that the punishment of free-riders becomes more effective. In fact, punished free-riders 
indeed increase their cooperation subsequently more strongly when the normative standard is 
present92. In addition, antisocial punishment also decreases in the presence of a normative 
cooperation standard thus lending support to the hypothesis that norms of civic cooperation may 
causally reduce antisocial punishment.  
These results are obtained despite the existence of counter-punishment opportunities which have 
previously – in the absence of normative requests – led to very low levels of cooperation and welfare. 
If subjects have the chance to coordinate on a normative consensus by establishing a cooperation 
standard the existence of peer punishment opportunities is from the very beginning associated with a 
higher group welfare compared to a setting in which peer punishment is ruled out92.  
In view of the high collateral cost of normatively uncoordinated peer punishment it is remarkable that 
in the presence of migration opportunities basically all subjects eventually migrate from a setting 
without any targeted punishment opportunities to one with uncoordinated peer punishment (fact 8). 
However, in these experiments the only alternative to uncoordinated peer punishment was the 
complete absence of punishment opportunities. What happens if we additionally allow migration to 
the following two institutions: (i) normatively coordinated peer punishment and (ii) normative 
coordination and punishment by a central (democratically elected) authority?  
When given the chance to migrate between all four institutions – no punishment, uncoordinated peer 
punishment, normatively coordinated peer punishment and centralized punishment with normative 
coordination – subjects basically never enter the uncoordinated peer punishment institution and 
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rather quickly almost all subjects enter institutions with normative coordination (Fig. 3). These 
institutions minimize or fully eradicate antisocial punishment and generate high levels of cooperation 
without the collateral damages associated with uncoordinated peer punishment91. This demonstrates 
that the traditional uncoordinated peer punishment institution fails to capture a very important 
dimension: the strong demand for normative coordination and regulation – a demand that societies 
who inevitably have to rely on some forms of peer sanctioning typically satisfy through the formation 
of social norms that put constraints on individuals’ sanctioning behavior. Of course, groups will not 
automatically solve inefficient peer sanctioning through informal constraints but it seems likely that 
those groups who do solve this problem in a more efficient way will be more successful because they 
are better able to solve their collective action problems1,114,115. Therefore, they are better able to 
compete with other groups. Thus, conclusions regarding the effectiveness and the welfare properties 
of peer punishment may provide a misleading picture if they are based on institutional settings that 
rule out suitable normative consensus building opportunities that can put constraints on peer 
sanctioning.  
 
Figure 3: Norm formation and the emergence of efficient punishment institutions 
Notes: This graph is taken from Fehr and Williams 91. The figure depicts how the share of subjects in the four available institutions evolves 
over time. “No Punishment” is a regular public goods game without punishment. “Uncoordinated Peer Punishment” is a public goods 
game with peer punishment, but without norm formation. “Coordinated Peer Punishment” is a public goods game with the possibility of 
peer punishment and a norm formation opportunity. “Central Punishment” is a public goods game with norm formation and punishment 
exerted by an elected authority. 
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Summary and open questions 
The pervasiveness of social norms and the ubiquity of cooperation among non-kin are two salient 
features of human societies. Many social norms are beneficial for overall society and to the extent to 
which individuals voluntarily obey them we can view their behavior as an act of cooperation. Although 
humans are by no means the only species displaying cooperation among individuals, it has often been 
pointed out that the breadth and depth of human large-scale cooperation among non-kin in a 
globalized world, as well as the observed cooperation in one-shot encounters, appear unique in the 
animal kingdom5,116-118. Several potential factors – such as limited memory or excessive time 
discounting117,119 – may constitute evolutionary obstacles to cooperation in animal species but perhaps 
the cognitive prerequisites for social norms are also relevant. For example, the very notion of a 
normative standard – what ought to be done – is rather complex and perhaps even impossible to 
identify reliably in species that lack sophisticated language. The same applies to the notion of 
normative approval and disapproval. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that our closest living 
relatives do not seem to share some of our most fundamental norms of fairness and cooperation120-122 
(although see 123,124) and that there seems to be no evidence for third party punishment of norm 
violations harming non-kin in non-human species125. In contrast, third party punishment of non-kin and 
even strangers is frequent in humans24,59,82 and young children already have a working knowledge of 
social norms122,126,127. The widespread prevalence of social norms may therefore well be one of the 
defining characteristics of our species and a crucial determinant of human cooperation. 
The evidence suggests that human cooperation is strongly affected by normative considerations. 
Various methods for the identification of social norms indicate the existence of a conditional 
cooperation norm that is a key ingredient for the explanation of major cooperation-related facts. The 
behavioral strength of the conditional cooperation norm probably also derives from the fact that it is 
consistent with principles of equity and reciprocity and that purely conformist preferences also imply 
conditionally cooperative behavior. Compliance with social norms relies on the existence of social 
preferences that incorporate abstract normative principles such as equity or reciprocity – which also 
provide foundations for the willingness to punish norm violators – or are based on the desire for 
avoiding disapproval, a prosocial self-image or the avoidance of disappointing others. Social norms also 
appear to guide and constrain punishment behavior and subjects have a strong desire for 
environments that enable normative coordination.  
There are, however, still many important unanswered questions. Reliable empirical knowledge about 
the precise channels through which norms have a causal impact is, for example, still scarce. Does the 
normative standard shape behavior directly via an intrinsic utility component or does it have an impact 
by affecting and coordinating beliefs about others’ cooperation. Or does it guide the punishment of 
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free-riders and affect beliefs about punishment in case of non-compliance? In addition, there are many 
other intriguing and exciting questions that are awaiting an answer (see text box on important 
unresolved research problems), implying that there is still much to discover in this area of research.  
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Fig. 1a. Cooperation rates in a one-shot social dilemma 
game with and without pre-play communication among 
the subjects8. This graph illustrates Result (1).  
 
 
Fig. 1b. Evidence for Result 2. Higher expectations of other 
group members’ cooperation causes on average an 
increase in individual’s own cooperation but individuals 
are heterogeneous with 50% conditional cooperators, 30% 
full free-riders and 14% hump-shaped conditional 
cooperators12.  
 
Fig. 1c: Evidence for Result (3). Decline in cooperation rates 
over time in finitely repeated public goods experiments in 
which free-riding is the payoff maximizing strategy for 
selfish subjects22,128,129.  
 
Fig. 1d. Evidence for Result (3) and (4). Cooperation rates 
in partner treatments are typically higher than those in 
stranger treatments. In this study, subjects initially 
believed to interact for 10 periods after which the 
experimenter implemented a surprise restart of the same 
10-period experiment.19  
 
  
Fig. 1e. Evidence for Result (5). Merely calling the 
prisoners’ dilemma a Community game – as opposed to a 
Stock Market game – increases cooperation; but if the 
game is played sequentially, this framing effect vanishes20.   
 
Fig. 1f. Evidence for Result (6) and (7). Punishment – 
measured in terms of the experienced percentage reduction 
in income – of group members as a function of the deviation 
of their cooperation level from the average cooperation of 
other group members. Punishment of free-riders is very high 
– even in the stranger treatment – but above average 
cooperators also face some “perverse” punishment22.  
Community Game 
Stock Market Game 
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Fig. 1g Evidence for Result (7). There are strong cultural 
differences in antisocial punishment of cooperators31. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1h. Evidence for Result (8). Subjects could choose in every 
period whether they want to be in the group with a peer 
punishment opportunity or the group without this opportunity 
(VCM). The figure shows that the vast majority of subjects 
eventually prefer the community with peer punishment34.  
 
Fig 1i. Evidence for Result (6) and (9). The opportunity to 
punish peers after they observed others’ cooperation levels 
(treatment PN) leads to large increases in cooperation relative 
to a control treatment without peer punishment (Control). The 
opportunity to mutually reward each other (RN) leads to 
similarly high cooperation levels compared to PN and 
treatments with both reward and punishment (RNP)38.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1j. Evidence for Result (10i). Top cooperators in a 
one-shot PD are grouped together in a subsequent 10-
period public goods game. Likewise, the middle and the 
low cooperators are grouped together. Top cooperators 
achieve very high cooperation rates during the first nine 
periods40. 
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TEXT BOX ON IMPORTANT UNSOLVED RESEARCH PROBLEMS 
There are still substantial gaps in our knowledge of the origins, the determinants and the 
consequences of social norms. Below we list 10 important questions and, if possible, add 
references that deal with these questions.  
1) What are micro-sociological and psychological processes that facilitate and hinder the 
development of a social norm? 
2) What is – at the conceptual level – the precise relationship between social preferences and social 
norms and how can we distinguish them empirically? How do social norms influence the 
motivational content of social preferences and, for given social preferences, how do they affect 
compliance with normative standards? 
3) What determines individuals’ agreement with the “ought component” of norms?92 How do they 
come to internalize or reject a normative standard? 
4) What explains the formation and the decay of social norms and how can we explain changes in 
the normative content, i.e., the “ought component” of social norms?92 
5) What are the long-run environmental and economic determinants of social norms?130-133 and how 
do normative standards evolve in the context of conflicting economic interests?75 
6) How do economic incentives, the human desire for social approval and normative standards 
interact? When are they complements and when do economic incentives undermine normative 
standards and approval incentives?134 
7) How does actual compliance and non-compliance shape the development of normative 
standards?92 
8) Through which interventions and public policies is it possible to shape social norms76 and which 
aspect of the norm and norm-related behaviors – the content of the normative standard, social 
agreement with the normative standard, behavioral compliance with the standard – is changed 
by the intervention? 
9) How do legal institutions – apart from their sanctioning capacity – affect social norms and how do 
social norms affect the effectiveness of legal institutions?134,135 To what extent do legal institutions 
shape normative standards by setting precedent, fall back rules or through expressing what is 
normatively approved and expected?136 
10) To what extent and in which ways do social norms influence important economic and social 
patterns?91,92,137-139 
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Box on: How social preferences transform the prisoners’ dilemma 
In the prisoners’ dilemma (PD) each of 2 players makes one of 2 choices: cooperate or defect. Material 
payoffs are such that regardless of the opponent’s choice it is always in the self-interest of a player to 
defect (Table 1a). However, if both players defect they are worse off than if both cooperate, hence the 
dilemma.  
Table 1a. Representation of prisoners’ dilemma in terms of material payoffs 
  Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
Cooperate (C) 4, 4 0, 5 
Defect (D) 5, 0 1, 1 
If both players are sufficiently inequity averse their subjective preferences transform the PD into a 
different game in which mutual cooperation is also an equilibrium. In general, what subjects perceive 
as inequitable or equitable is likely to be shaped by society and the prevailing social norms63 but the 
simplest form of inequity aversion is inequality aversion. In case of inequality aversion a player suffers 
from receiving less than the other with parameter αi (envy), and also from receiving more than the 
other with parameter βi (compassion). An inequality averse player i’s subjective payoff ui is a function 
of her own economic payoff xi and of the payoff differences (xj - xi) between the two players: ui = xi  - 
αi(xj - xi) if player i is worse off than player j (xj - xi ≥ 0), and ui = xi - βi(xi - xj) if player i is better off than 
player j (xi - xj ≥ 0). Inequality aversion makes unilateral defection less attractive by reducing the 
subjective payoff from 5 to (5 - 5β) while being the victim of the other player’s unilateral defection is 
particularly painful because it reduces the subjective payoff from 0 to – 5α. Thus, for α = 1 and β = 0.5 
the PD is transformed into a coordination game in which both (C, C) and (D, D) are an equilibrium (Table 
1b). Thus, if both players believe that the other one cooperates it is in their subjective interest to 
cooperate as well because the payoff of mutual cooperation is 4 while the payoff of unilateral defection 
is only 2.5. 
Table 1b. Utility representation of prisoners’ dilemma if players are inequality averse with 
parameters α = 1 and β = 0.5 
  Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
Cooperate (C) 4, 4 –5, 2.5 
Defect (D) 2.5, –5 1, 1 
Similar results are obtained if both players have a sufficiently strong preference for reciprocity which 
can be modelled by a utility function such as ui = xi  + γki𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  where γ is positive and measures the 
strength of i’s preferences for reciprocity, ki is i’s actual kindness to the other player, 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  and is i’s 
expected kindness of player j towards himself. ki > 0 if player i is kind to player j whereas ki < 0 if player 
i is unkind to player j. kj is i’s perceived kindness of player j. What is perceived as kind and unkind is 
likely to be shaped by social norms prevailing in society but it seems very plausible that cooperation in 
the PD is perceived as kind. Thus, suppose that each of the two players believes that the other one 
cooperates and perceives this to be kind (𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  > 0). This means that each player can increase utility ui 
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by reciprocating, i.e. being actually kind to the other player by cooperating (ki > 0). Thus, as in the case 
of inequality aversion the material payoffs no longer represent the true utilities and for a sufficiently 
large γ both players derive more utility from mutual cooperation than from unilateral defection. 
However, if the player’s believe that the other player is unkind by defecting (𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  < 0) they have again 
an incentive to reciprocate by setting ki < 0 through defection.  
A similar albeit slightly different logic applies in the case of guilt averse individuals. Here, i’s utility is 
given by ui = xi  - γ max {0, 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 −  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖} where γ >0 measures the propensity to feel guilty if one does not 
live up to what i believes that the other player expects from i, and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∈  {0, 𝑐𝑐  } denotes defection (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 =0) or cooperation (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐) . I’s belief about the partner’s expectation is denoted by 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒. Thus, if 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 =  𝑐𝑐 
and player i defects (i.e., 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 0), utility is given by ui = xi - γ 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 which is – for sufficiently large guilt 
aversion smaller than γ – smaller than the utility of meeting the believed expectation of the other 
player.  
 
 
 
